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Abstract
The local model for differential privacy is emerging as the reference model for practical applications
of collecting and sharing sensitive information while satisfying strong privacy guarantees. In the local
model, there is no trusted entity which is allowed to have each individual’s raw data as is assumed in the
traditional curator model for differential privacy. Individuals’ data are usually perturbed before sharing
them. We explore the design of private hypothesis tests in the local model, where each data entry is
perturbed to ensure the privacy of each participant. Specifically, we analyze locally private chi-square
tests for goodness of fit and independence testing, which have been studied in the traditional, curator
model for differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Hypothesis testing is a widely applied statistical tool used to test whether given models should be rejected, or
not, based on sampled data from a population. Hypothesis testing was initially developed for scientific and
survey data, but today it is also an essential tool to test models over collections of social network, mobile, and
crowdsourced data (American Statistical Association, 2014; Hunter et al., 2008; Steele et al., 2017). Collected
data samples may contain highly sensitive information about the subjects, and the privacy of individuals
can be compromised when the results of a data analysis are released. In work from Homer et al. (2008), it
was shown that a subject in a dataset can be identified as being in the case or control group based on the
aggregate statistics of a genetic-wide association study (GWAS). Privacy-risks may bring data contributors
to opt out, which reduces the confidence in the data study. A way to address this concern is by developing
new techniques to support privacy-preserving data analysis. Among the different approaches, differential
privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b) has emerged as a viable solution: it provides strong privacy guarantees and
it allows to release accurate statistics. A standard way to achieve differential privacy is by injecting some
statistical noise in the computation of the data analysis. When the noise is carefully chosen, it helps to
protect the individual privacy without compromising the utility of the data analysis. Several recent works
have studied differentially private hypothesis tests that can be used in place of the standard, non-private
hypothesis tests (Uhler et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014; Sheffet, 2015; Karwa and Slavković, 2016; Wang et al.,
2015; Gaboardi et al., 2016; Kifer and Rogers, 2017; Cai et al., 2017). These tests work in the curator model
of differential privacy. In this model, the data is centrally stored and the curator carefully injects noise in the
computation of the data analysis in order to satisfy differential privacy.
In this work we instead address the local model of privacy, formally introduced by Raskhodnikova et al. (2008).
The first differentially private algorithm called randomized response – in fact it predates the definition of
differential privacy by more than 40 years – guarantees differential privacy in the local model (Warner, 1965).
In this model, there is no trusted centralized entity which is responsible for the noise injection. Instead, each
individual adds enough noise to guarantee differential privacy for their own data, which provides a stronger
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privacy guarantee when compared to traditional differential privacy. The data analysis is then run over the
collection of the individually sanitized data. The local model of differential privacy is a convenient model for
several applications: for example it is used to collect statistics about the activity of the Google Chrome Web
browser users (Erlingsson et al., 2014), and to collect statistics about the typing patterns of Apple’s iPhone
users (Apple Press Info, 2016). Despite these applications, the local model has received far less attention than
the more standard centralized curator model. This is in part due to the more firm requirements imposed by
this model, which make the design of effective data analysis harder.
Our main contribution is in designing chi-square hypothesis tests for the local model of differential privacy.
Similar to previous works we focus on goodness of fit and independence hypothesis tests. Most of the
differentially private chi-square hypothesis tests proposed so far are based on mechanisms that add noise in
some form to the aggregate data, e.g. the cells of the contingency tables, or the resulting chi-square statistics
value. These approaches cannot be used in the local model, since noise needs to be added at the individual’s
data level. We then consider instead general privatizing techniques in the local model, and we study how
to build new hypothesis tests with them. Each test we present is characterized by a specific local model
mechanism. The main technical challenge for designing each test is to create statistics, which incorporate the
local model mechanisms, that converge as we collect more data to a chi-square distribution, as in the classical
chi-square tests. We then use these statistics to find the critical value to correctly bound the Type I error.
We present three different goodness of fit tests: LocalNoiseGOF presents a statistic that guarantees the
convergence to a chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis so that we can use the correct critical
values when local (concentrated) differential privacy is guaranteed by adding Laplace or Gaussian noise to
the individual data; LocalExpGOF also provides a statistic that converges to a chi-square under the null
hypothesis when a private value for each individual is selected by using the exponential mechanism (McSherry
and Talwar, 2007); finally, LocalBitFlipGOF introduces a statistic that converges to a chi-square distribution
when the data is privatized using a bit flipping algorithm (Bassily and Smith, 2015), which provide better
accuracy for higher dimensional data. Further, we develop corresponding independence tests: LocalNoiseIND,
LocalExpIND, and LocalBitFlipIND. For all these tests we study their asymptotic behavior. A desiderata
for private hypothesis tests is to have a guaranteed upper bound on the probability of a false discovery (or
Type I error) – rejecting a null hypothesis or model when the data was actually generated from it – and to
minimize the probability of a Type II error, which is failing to reject the null hypothesis when the model is
indeed false. This latter criteria corresponds to the power of the statistical test. We then present experimental
results showing the power of the different tests which demonstrates that no single local differentially private
algorithm is best across all data dimensions and privacy parameter regimes.
2 Related Works
There have been several works in developing private hypothesis test for categorical data, but all look at the
traditional model of (concentrated) differential privacy instead of the local model, which we consider here.
Several works have explored private statistical inference for GWAS data, (Uhler et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2014;
Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013). Following these works, there has also been general work in private chi-square
hypothesis tests, where the main tests are for goodness of fit and independence testing, although some do
extend to more general tests (Wang et al., 2015; Gaboardi et al., 2016; Kifer and Rogers, 2017; Cai et al.,
2017; Kakizaki et al., 2017). Among these, the works most related to ours are the ones by (Gaboardi et al.,
2016; Kifer and Rogers, 2017). We will compare our work with these in Section 4 after introducing them.
There has also been work in private hypothesis testing for ordinary least squares regression (Sheffet, 2015).
There are other works that have studied statistical inference and estimators in the local model of differential
privacy. Duchi et al. (2013b,a) focus on controlling disclosure risk in statistical estimation and inference by
ensuring the analysis satisfies local differential privacy. They provide minimax convergence rates to show the
tight tradeoffs between privacy and statistical efficiency, i.e. the number of samples required to give quality
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estimators. In their work, they show that a generalized version of randomized response gives optimal sample
complexity for estimating the multinomial probability vector. We use this idea as the basis for our hypothesis
test LocalBitFlipGOF. Kairouz et al. (2014) also considers hypothesis testing in the local model, although
they measure utility in terms of f -divergences and do not give a decision rule, i.e. when to reject a given null
hypothesis. We provide statistics whose distributions asymptotically follow a chi-square distribution, which
allows for approximating statistical p-values that can be used in a decision rule. We consider their extremal
mechanisms and empirically confirm their result that for small privacy regimes (small ) one mechanism
has higher utility than other mechanisms and for large privacy regimes (large ) a different mechanism
outperforms the others. However, we measure utility in terms of the power of a locally private hypothesis
test subject to a given Type I error bound. Other notable works in the local privacy model include Pastore
and Gastpar (2016); Kairouz et al. (2016); Ye and Barg (2017)
3 Preliminaries
We consider datasets x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Xn in some data universe X , typically X = {0, 1}d where d is
the dimensionality. We first present the standard definition of differential privacy, as well as its variant
concentrated differential privacy. We say that two datasets x,x′ ∈ Xn are neighboring if they differ in at most
one element, i.e. ∃i ∈ [n] such that xi 6= x′i and ∀j 6= i, xj = x′j .
Definition 3.1 [Dwork et al. (2006b,a)]. An algorithmM : Xn → Y is (, δ)-differentially private (DP) if for
all neighboring datasets x,x′ ∈ Xn and for all outcomes S ⊆ Y, we have Pr [M(x) ∈ S] ≤ ePr [M(x′) ∈ S]+δ.
We then state the definition of zero-mean concentrated differential privacy.
Definition 3.2 [Bun and Steinke (2016)]. An algorithm M : Xn → Y is ρ-zero-mean concentrated differ-
entially private (zCDP) if for all neighboring datasets x,x′ ∈ Xn, we have the following bound for all t > 0
where the expectation is over outcomes y ∼M(x),
E
[
exp
(
t
(
ln
(
Pr [M(x) = y]
Pr [M(x′) = y]
)
− ρ
))]
≤ et2ρ.
Note that in both of these privacy definitions, it is assumed that all the data is stored in a central location
and the algorithm M can access all the data. Most of the work in differential privacy has been in this
trusted curator model. One of the main reasons for this is that we can achieve much greater accuracy in our
differentially private statistics when used in the curator setting. However, in many cases, having a trusted
curator is too strong of an assumption. We then define local differential privacy, formalized by Raskhodnikova
et al. (2008) and Dwork and Roth (2014), which does not require the subjects to release their raw data, rather
each data entry is perturbed to prevent the true entry from being stored. Thus, local differential privacy
ensures a very strong privacy guarantee.
Definition 3.3 [LR Oracle]. Given a dataset x, a local randomizer oracle LRx(·, ·) takes as input an index
i ∈ [n] and an -DP algorithm R, and outputs y ∈ Y chosen according to the distribution of R(xi), i.e.
LRx(i, R) = R(xi).
Definition 3.4 [Raskhodnikova et al. (2008)]. An algorithmM : Xn → Y is (, δ)-local differentially private
(LDP) if it accesses the input database x via the LR oracle LRx with the following restriction: if LR(i, Rj)
for j ∈ [k] areM’s invocations of LRx on index i, then each Rj for j ∈ [k] is (j , δj)- DP and
∑k
j=1 j ≤ ,∑k
j=1 δj ≤ δ.
An easy consequence of this definition is that an algorithm which is (, δ)-LDP is also (, δ)-DP. Note that
these definitions can be extended to include ρ-local zCDP (LzCDP) where each local randomizer is ρj-zCDP
and
∑k
j=1 ρj ≤ ρ. We point out the following connection between LzCDP and LDP , which follows directly
from results in Bun and Steinke (2016)
Lemma 3.5. If M : Xn → Y is (, 0)-LDP then it is also 2/2-LzCDP. If M is ρ-LzCDP, then it is also((
ρ+
√
2ρ ln(2/δ)
)
, δ
)
-LDP for any δ > 0.
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Thus, in the local setting, (pure) LDP (where δ = 0) provides the strongest level of privacy, followed by
LzCDP and then approximate-LDP (where δ > 0).
4 Chi-Square Hypothesis Tests
As was studied in Gaboardi et al. (2016), Wang et al. (2015), and Kifer and Rogers (2017), we will study
hypothesis tests with categorical data. A null hypothesis, or model H0 is how we might expect the data to be
generated. The goal for hypothesis testing is to reject the null hypothesis if the data is not likely to have
been generated from the given model. As is common in statistical inference, we want to design hypothesis
tests to bound the probability of a false discovery (or Type I error), i.e. rejecting a null hypothesis when
the data was actually generated from it, by at most some amount α, such as 5%. However, designing tests
that achieve this is easy, because we can just ignore the data and always fail to reject the null hypothesis, i.e.
have an inconclusive test. Thus, we would additionally like to design our tests so that they can reject H0 if
the data was not actually generated from the given model. We then want to minimize the probability of a
Type II error, which is failing to reject H0 when the model is false, subject to a given Type I error.
For goodness of fit testing, we assume that each individual’s data X i for i ∈ [n] is sampled i.i.d. from
Multinomial(1, p) where p ∈ Rd>0 and pᵀ·1 = 1. The classical chi-square hypothesis test (without privacy) forms
the histogram H = (H1, · · · , Hd) =
∑n
i=1X i and computes the chi-square statistic T =
∑d
j=1
(Hj−np0j)
2
np0j
.
The reason for using this statistic is that it converges in distribution to χ2d−1 as more data is collected, i.e.
n→∞, when H0 : p = p0 holds. Hence, we can ensure the probability of false discovery to be close to α as
long as we only reject H0 when T > χ2d−1,1−α where the critical value χ
2
d−1,1−α is defined as the following
quantity Pr
[
χ2d−1 > χ
2
d−1,1−α
]
= α.
4.1 Prior Private Chi-square Tests in the Curator Model
One approach for chi-square private hypothesis tests that was explored by Gaboardi et al. (2016) and Wang
et al. (2015) is to add noise (Gaussian or Laplace) directly to the histogram to ensure privacy and then use
the classical test statistic. Note that the resulting asymptotic distribution needs to be modified for such
changes to the statistic – it is no longer a chi-square random variable. To introduce the different statistics,
we will consider goodness of fit testing after adding noise Z from distribution Dn to the histogram of counts
H˜ = H + Z , which ensures ρ-zCDP when D = N (0, 1/ρ) and -DP when D = Lap(2/). The chi-square
statistic then becomes
T˜ (D) =
d∑
i=1
(
Hi + Zi − np0i
)2
np0i
where Z ∼ Dn. (1)
They then show that this statistic converges in distribution to a linear combination of chi-squared random
variables, when D ∼ N (0, 1/ρ) and ρ is also decreasing with n.
In followup work from Kifer and Rogers (2017), the authors showed that modifying the chi-square statistic
to account for the additional noise leads to tests with better empirical power. The projected statistic from
Kifer and Rogers (2017) is the following where we use projection matrix Π defn=
(
Id − 1d11ᵀ
)
, middle matrix
Mσ = Π
(
Diag
(
p0 + σ
)− p0 (p0)ᵀ)−1 Π, and sample noise Z ∼ Dn,
T
(n)
KR (σ;D) = n
(
H +Z
n
− p0
)ᵀ
Mσ
(
H +Z
n
− p0
)
. (2)
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We use D = Lap(2/) with σ = 8n2 for an -DP claim or D = N (0, 1/ρ) with σ = 1nρ for a ρ-zCDP claim.
When comparing the power of all our tests, we will be considering the alternate H1 : p = p1n where
p1n = p
0 +
∆√
n
where 1ᵀ∆ = 0. (3)
Theorem 4.1 [Kifer and Rogers (2017)]. Under the null hypothesis H0 : p = p0, the statistic T
(n)
KR
(
1
nρ ; N (0, 1/ρ)
)
given in (2) for ρ > 0 converges in distribution to χ2d−1. Further, under the alternate hypothesis H1 : p = p
1
n,
the resulting asymptotic distribution is a noncentral chi-square random variable,
T
(n)
KR
(
1
nρ
; N (0, 1/ρ)
)
D→
χ2d−1
(
∆ᵀ
(
Diag(p0)− p0 (p0)ᵀ + 1/ρId)−1 ∆) .
When D = Lap(2/), we can still obtain the null hypothesis distribution using Monte Carlo simulations to
estimate the critical value, since the asymptotic distribution will no longer be chi-square. That is, we can
obtain m samples from the statistic under the null hypothesis with Laplace noise added to the histogram of
counts. We can then guarantee that the probability of a false discovery is at most α as long as m > d1/αe
(see Gaboardi et al. (2016) for more details).
5 Local Private Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Tests
We now turn to designing local private goodness of fit tests. We begin by showing how the existing statistics
from the previous section can be used in the local setting and then develop new tests based on the exponential
mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) and bit flipping (Bassily and Smith, 2015). Each test is locally
private because it perturbs each individual’s data through a local randomizer. We finish the section by
empirically checking the power of each test to see which tests outperform others in different parameter regimes.
We empirically show that the power of a test is directly related to the size of the noncentral parameter of the
chi-square statistic under the alternate distribution.
5.1 Goodness of Fit Test with Noise Addition
In the local model we can add Z i ∼ N
(
0, 1ρ Id
)
independent noise to each individual’s data X i to ensure
ρ-LzCDP or Z i
i.i.d.∼ Lap ( 2 ) independent noise to X i to ensure -LDP. In either case, the resulting noisy
histogram Ĥ = H +Z where Z =
∑
iZ i will have variance that scales with n for fixed privacy parameters
, ρ > 0. Consider the case where we add Gaussian noise, which results in the following histogram, Ĥ = H +Z
where Z ∼ N
(
0, nρ Id
)
. Thus, we can use either statistic T˜ (ρ/n) or T(n)KR (ρ/n), with the latter statistic
typically having better empirical power (Kifer and Rogers, 2017). We then give our first local private
hypothesis test in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5.1. LocalNoiseGOF is ρ-LzCDP when D = N (0, 1/ρ) and -LDP when D = Lap(2/).
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that we are adding appropriately scaled noise to each individual’s
data via the Gaussian mechanism and then LocalNoiseGOF aggregates the privatized data, which is just a
post-processing function on the privatized data.
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Algorithm 1 Locally Private GOF Test:LocalNoiseGOF
Input: x = (x1, · · · ,xn), ρ, α, H0 : p = p0.
Let H =
∑n
`=1 x`
if D = N (0, n/ρ) then
Set q = T(n)KR (1/ρ;D) given in (2).
if q > χ2d−1,1−α Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
if D = ∑ni=1 Lap(2/) then
Set q = T(n)KR
(
8/2;D) given in (2).
Sample m > d1/αe from the distribution of T(n)KR
(
8/2;D) assuming H0
Set τ to be the d(m+ 1)(1− α)eth largest sample.
if q > τ Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
Although we cannot guarantee the probability of a Type I error at most α due to the fact that we use the
asymptotic distribution (as in the tests from prior work and the classical chi-square tests without privacy), we
expect the Type I errors to be similar to those from the nonprivate test. Note that the test can be modified
to accommodate arbitrary noise distributions, e.g. Laplace to ensure differential privacy as was done in Kifer
and Rogers (2017). In this case, we can use a Monte Carlo (MC) approach to estimate the critical value τ
that ensures the probability of a Type I error is at most α if we reject H0 when the statistic is larger than τ .
For the local setting, if each individual perturbs each coordinate by adding Lap (2/) then this will ensure
our test is -LDP. However, the sum of independent Laplace random variables is not Laplace, so we will
need to estimate a sum of n independent Laplace random variables using MC. In the experiments section we
will compare the other local private tests with the version of LocalNoiseGOF which uses Laplace noise and
samples m entries from the exact distribution under H0 to find the critical value.
Rather than having to add noise to each component of the original data histogram, we consider applying
randomized response to obtain a LDP hypothesis test. We will use a form of the exponential mechanism
(McSherry and Talwar, 2007) given in Algorithm 2 which takes a single data entry from the set {e1, · · · , ed},
where ej ∈ Rd is the standard basis element with a 1 in the jth coordinate and is zero elsewhere, and reports
the original entry with probability slightly more than uniform and otherwise reports a different element. Note
thatMEXP takes a single data entry and is -differentially private.
Algorithm 2 Exponential Mechanism: MEXP
Input: x ∈ {e1, · · · , ed}, .
Let q(x,z) = 1{x = z}
Select xˇ with probability exp[ q(x,xˇ)]e−1+d
Output: xˇ
We have the following result when we useMEXP on each data entry to obtain a private histogram.
Lemma 5.2. If we have histogram H =
∑n
i=1X i, where {X i} i.i.d.∼ Multinomial(1, p) and we write Hˇ =∑n
i=1MEXP(X i, ) for each i ∈ [n], then Hˇ ∼ Multinomial(n, pˇ) where
pˇ = p
(
e
e + d− 1
)
+ (1− p)
(
1
e + d− 1
)
. (4)
Once we have identified the distribution of Hˇ , we can create a chi-square statistic by subtracting Hˇ by its
expectation and dividing the difference by the expectation. Hence testing H0 : p = p0 after the data has
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passed through the exponential mechanism, is equivalent to testing H0 : p = pˇ0 with data Hˇ . We will use the
following classical result to prove our theorems.
Theorem 5.3 [Ferguson (1996)]. If X ∼ N (µ,Σ) and Σ is a projection matrix of rank ν and Σµ = µ then
XᵀX ∼ χ2ν(µᵀµ).
We can then form a chi-square statistic using the private histogram Hˇ which will have the correct asymptotic
distribution.
Theorem 5.4. Let H ∼ Multinomial(n,p) and Hˇ be given in Lemma 5.2 with privacy parameter  > 0.
Under the null hypothesis H0 : p = p0, we have for pˇ0 = 1e+d−1
(
ep0 + (1− p0)), and
T
(n)
Exp () =
d∑
j=1
(Hˇj − npˇ0j )2
npˇ0j
D→ χ2d−1. (5)
Further, with alternate H1 : p = p1n, the resulting asymptotic distribution is the following, T
(n)
Exp ()
D→
χ2d−1
((
e−1
e+d−1
)2∑d
j=1
∆2j
pˇ0j
)
Proof. Let V =
√
n
(
Hˇ/n−pˇ0
pˇ0
)
, which converges in distribution to N
(
0, Id −
√
pˇ0
√
pˇ0
ᵀ)
, by the central limit
theorem. We then apply Theorem 5.3 with µ = 0 and Id −
√
pˇ0
√
pˇ0
ᵀ
being a projection matrix of rank d− 1.
In the second statement we assume the alternate p = p1 holds, in which case V converges in distribution
to N
((
e−1
e+d−1
)
∆
pˇ0
, Id −
√
pˇ0
√
pˇ0
ᵀ)
. We then verify that
(
e−1
e+d−1
)(
Id −
√
pˇ0
√
pˇ0
ᵀ)
∆
pˇ0
=
(
e−1
e+d−1
)
∆
pˇ0
to
prove the second statement.
We then base our LDP goodness of fit test on this result to obtain the correct critical value to reject the null
hypothesis based on a chi-square distribution. The test is presented in Algorithm 3. The following result is
Algorithm 3 Local DP GOF Test: LocalExpGOF
Input: x = (x1, · · · ,xn), , α, H0 : p = p0.
Let pˇ0 = 1e+d−1
(
ep0 + (1− p0)).
Let Hˇ =
∑n
i=1MEXP(xi, ).
Set q =
∑d
j=1
(hˇj−npˇ0j )2
npˇ0j
if q > χ2d−1,1−α Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
immediate from the exponential mechanism being -DP and the fact that we use it as a local randomizer.
Theorem 5.5. LocalExpGOF is -LDP.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that we useMEXP for each individual’s data and then LocalExpGOF
aggregates the privatized data, which is just a post-processing function.
5.2 Goodness of Fit Test with Bit Flipping
Note that the noncentral parameter in Theorem 5.4 goes to zero as d grows large due to the coefficient being(
e−1
e+d−1
)2
. Thus, for large dimensional data the exponential mechanism cannot reject a false null hypothesis.
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We next consider another differentially private algorithmM : {e1, · · · , ed} → {0, 1}d, given in Algorithm 4
used in Bassily and Smith (2015) that flips each bit with some biased probability.
Algorithm 4 Bit Flip Local Randomizer: Mbit
Input: x ∈ {e1, · · · , ed}, .
for j ∈ [d] do
Set zj = xj with probability e
/2
e/2+1
, otherwise zj = (1− xj).
Output: z
Theorem 5.6. The algorithmMbit is -DP.
We then want to form a statistic based on the output z ∈ {0, 1}d that is asymptotically distributed as a
chi-square under the null hypothesis. We defer the proof to the appendix.
Lemma 5.7. We consider data X i ∼ Multinomial(1, p) for each i ∈ [n]. We define the following covariance
matrix Σ(p) and mean vector p˜ = [(
e/2−1)p+1]
e/2+1
, in terms of α =
(
e/2−1
e/2+1
)
Σ(p) =α2 [Diag (p)− p (p)ᵀ] +
e/2(
e/2 + 1
)2 Id (6)
The histogram H˜ =
∑n
i=1Mbit(X i) has the following asymptotic distribution
√
n
(
H˜
n − p˜
)
D→ N (0,Σ(p)) .
Further, Σ(p) is invertible for any  > 0 and p > 0.
Following a similar analysis in Kifer and Rogers (2017) and using Theorem 5.3, we can form the following
statistic for null hypothesis H0 : p = p0 in terms of the histogram H˜ and projection matrix Π = Id − 1d11ᵀ, as
well as the covariance matrix Σ
(
p0
)
and mean vector p˜0 both given in (6) where we replace p with p0:
T
(n)
BitFlip () = n
(
H˜
n
− p˜0
)ᵀ
ΠΣ
(
p0
)−1
Π
(
H˜
n
− p˜0]
)
(7)
We can then design a hypothesis test based on the outputs fromMbit in Algorithm 5
Algorithm 5 Local DP GOF Test: LocalBitFlipGOF
Input: x = (x1, · · · ,xn), , α, H0 : p = p0.
Let H˜ =
∑n
i=1Mbit(xi, ).
Set q = T(n)BitFlip ()
if q > χ2d−1,1−α Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
Theorem 5.8. LocalBitFlipGOF is -LDP.
We now show that the statistic in (7) is asymptotically distributed as χ2d−1.
Theorem 5.9. If the null hypothesis H0 : p = p0 holds, then the statistic T
(n)
BitFlip () is asymptotically
distributed as a chi-square, i.e. T(n)BitFlip ()
D→ χ2d−1. Further, if we consider the alternate H1 : p = p1 then
T
(n)
BitFlip ()
D→ χ2d−1
((
e/2−1
e/2+1
)2
·∆ᵀΣ(p0)−1∆
)
.
Proof. From Lemma 5.7, we know that
√
n
(
H˜
n − p˜0
)
D→ N
(
0,Σ(p˜0)
)
. Since Σ(p˜0) is full rank and has an
eigenvector that is all ones. Thus, we can diagonalize the covariance matrix as Σ(p˜0) = BDBᵀ where D is a
8
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Figure 1: The coefficient on ∆ᵀ∆ in the noncentral parameter for the local private tests where “LocalGauss-
GOF" is LocalNoiseGOF with Gaussian noise, LocalExpGOF, and LocalBitFlipGOF for various dimensions
d and .
diagonal matrix and B has orthogonal columns with one of them being 1d1. Thus, we have
√
nΣ(p˜0)−1/2Π
(
H˜
n
− p˜0
)
D→ N (0,Λ)
where Λ = Σ(p˜0)−1/2ΠBDBᵀΠΣ(p˜0)−1/2. Hence, Λ will be the identity matrix with a single zero on the
diagonal. We then apply Theorem 5.3 tp prove the first statement.
To prove the second statement we assume that p = p1 holds, which gives
√
n
(
H˜
n − p˜0
)
D→ N
(
α ·∆,Σ(p˜0)
)
.
Thus,
√
nΣ(p˜0)−1/2Π
(
H˜
n
− p˜0
)
D→ N
(
α · Σ(p˜0)−1/2∆,Λ
)
We again use Theorem 5.3 to obtain the noncentral parameter α2 ·∆ᵀΣ(p˜0)−1∆.
5.3 Comparison of Noncentral Parameters
We now compare the noncentral parameters of the three local private tests we presented in Algorithms 1, 3
and 5. We consider the null hypothesis p0 = (1/d, · · · , 1/d) for d > 2, and alternate H1 : p = p0 + ∆√n . In this
case, we can easily compare the various noncentral parameters for various privacy parameters and dimensions
d. In Figure 1 we give the coefficient to the term ∆ᵀ∆ in the noncentral parameter of the asymptotic
distribution for each local private test presented thus far. The larger this coefficient is, the better the power
will be for any alternate ∆ vector. Note that in LocalNoiseGOF, we set ρ = 2/8 which makes the variance
the same as for a random variable distributed as Lap(2/) for an -DP guarantee – recall that LocalNoiseGOF
with Gaussian noise does not satisfy -DP for any  > 0. We give results for  ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} which are all in
the range of privacy parameters that have been considered in actual locally differentially private algorithms
used in practice.1 From the plots, we see how LocalExpGOF may outperform LocalBitFlipGOF depending
on the privacy parameter and dimension of the data. We can use these plots to determine which test to use
given  and dimension of data d. When H0 is not uniform, we can use the noncentral parameters given for
each test to determine which test has the largest noncentral parameter for a particular privacy budget .
5.4 Empirical Results
We then empirically compare the power between LocalNoiseGOF with Laplace noise in Algorithm 1,
LocalExpGOF in Algorithm 3, and LocalBitFlipGOF in Algorithm 5. Recall that all three of these tests have
1In Erlingsson et al. (2014), we know that Google uses  = ln(3) ≈ 1.1 in RAPPOR and from Aleksandra Korolova’s Twitter
post on September 13, 2016 https://twitter.com/korolova/status/775801259504734208 we know that Apple uses  = 1, 4.
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the same privacy benchmark of local differential privacy. For LocalNoiseGOF with Laplace noise, we will use
m = 999 samples in out Monte Carlo simulations. In our experiments we fix α = 0.05 and  ∈ {1, 2, 4}. We then
consider null hypotheses of the form p0 = (1/d, 1/d, · · · , 1/d) and alternate H1 : p = p0 + η(1,−1, · · · , 1,−1)
for some η > 0. In Figure 2, we plot the number of times our tests correctly rejects the null hypothesis in
1000 independent trials for various sample sizes n and privacy parameters .
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Figure 2: Comparison of empirical power among the classical non-private test and the local private tests
LocalNoiseGOF with Laplace noise (solid line), LocalExpGOF (dashed line), and LocalBitFlipGOF (dotted
line); in the left plot, d = 4 and η = 0.01, in the right plot, d = 40 and η = 0.005.
From Figure 2, we can see that the test statistics that have the largest noncentral parameter for a particular
dimension d and privacy parameter  will have the best empirical power. When d = 4, we see that LocalExpGOF
performs the best. However, for d = 40 it is not so clear cut. When  = 4, we can see that LocalExpGOF
does the best, but then when  = 2, LocalBitFlipGOF does best. Thus, the best Local DP Goodness of Fit
test depends on the noncentral parameter, which is a function of , the null hypothesis p0, and alternate
p = p0 + ∆. Note that the worst local DP test also depends on the privacy parameter and the dimension
d. Based on our empirical results, we see that no single locally private test is best for all data dimensions.
Knowing the corresponding noncentral parameter for a given problem is useful in determining which tests to
use, where the larger the noncentral parameter is the higher the power will be.
6 Local Private Independence Tests
We now show that our techniques can be extended to include composite hypothesis tests, where we test
whether the data comes from a whole family of probability distributions. We will focus on independence
testing, but much of the theory can be extended to general chi-square tests. We will closely follow the
presentation and notation as in (Kifer and Rogers, 2017).
We consider two multinomial random variables {U `}n`=1 i.i.d.∼ Multinomial(1,pi(1)) for pi(1) ∈ Rr, {V `}n`=1 i.i.d.∼
Multinomial(1,pi(2)) for pi(2) ∈ Rc and no component of pi(1) or pi(2) is zero. Without loss of generality, we will
consider an individual to be in one of r groups who reports a data record that is in one of c categories. The
collected data consists of n joint outcomes H whose (i, j)th coordinate is Hi,j =
∑n
`=1 1{U`,i = 1 & V`,j =
1}. Note that H is then the contingency table over the joint outcomes.
Under the null hypothesis of independence between {U `}n`=1 and {V `}n`=1, we have
H ∼ Multinomial
(
n,p(pi(1),pi(2))
)
where p(pi(1),pi(2)) = pi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ
(8)
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What makes this test difficult is that the analyst does not know the data distribution p(pi(1),pi(2)) and so
cannot simply plug it into the chi-square statistic. Rather, we use the data to estimate the best guess for the
unknown probability distribution that satisfies the null hypothesis.
Note that without privacy, each individual ` ∈ [n] is reporting a r × c matrix X ` which would be 1 in exactly
one location. Thus we can alternatively write the contingency table as H =
∑n
`=1X `. We then use the three
local private algorithms we presented earlier for noise addition, exponential mechanism, and bit flipping to
see how we can form a private chi-square statistic for independence testing. We want to be able to ensure the
privacy of both the group and the category that each individual belongs to.
For completeness, we will present the minimum chi-square asymptotic theory from Ferguson (1996) that was
used in Kifer and Rogers (2017). We will use this theory to design general chi-square test statistics for local
differentially private hypothesis tests. Consider a d dimensional random vector V (n) and a k ≤ d dimensional
parameter space Θ, which is an open subset of Rk. We want to measure the distance between the random
variable V (n) and some model A(θ) that maps parameters in Θ to Rd. We then use the following quadratic
form where M(θ) ∈ Rd×d is a positive-semidefinite matrix.
n
(
V (n) −A(θ)
)ᵀ
M(θ)
(
V (n) −A(θ)
)
(9)
We want to ensure the following assumptions hold.
Assumption 6.1. For all θ ∈ Θ, we have
• There exists a parameter θ? ∈ Θ such that for some model A(·) and covariance matrix C(·)
√
n
(
V (n) −A(θ?)
)
D→ N (0, C(θ?))
• A(θ) is bicontinuous.
• A(θ) has continuous first partial derivatives, denoted as A˙(θ), with full rank k.
• The matrix M(θ) is continuous in θ and there exists an η > 0 such that M(θ)− ηId is positive definite
in an open neighborhood of θ?.
We will then use the following useful result from Kifer and Rogers (2017)[Theorem 4.2].
Theorem 6.2 [Kifer and Rogers (2017)]. Let ν be the rank of C(θ?). If Assumption 6.1 holds, and for all
θ ∈ Θ we have
C(θ)M(θ)C(θ) = C(θ)
C(θ)M(θ)A˙(θ) = A˙(θ)
Then for any estimate φ(V (n)) P→ θ? we have
min
θ∈Θ
{
n
(
V (n) −A(θ)
)ᵀ
M(φ(V (n)))
(
V (n) −A(θ)
)}
D→ χ2ν−k.
To ensure the assumptions hold, we will assume that each component of pi(1),pi(2) is positive, i.e. pi(i) > 0 for
i = 1, 2.
6.1 Independence Test with Noise Addition
For noise addition, we will have the following contingency table H +Z (treating H as an r × c vector) where
Z = N
(
0, nρ
)
for ρ-LzCDP or Z is the sum of n independent Laplace random vectors with scale parameter
2/ in each coordinate for -LDP, although we will only consider the Gaussian noise case. We can then use
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the same statistic presented in Kifer and Rogers (2017) with a rescaling of the variance in the noise and
flattening the contingency table as a vector. For convenience, we write the marginals as Hi,· =
∑c
j=1Hi,j
and similarly for H·,j . Further, we will write n̂ = n+
∑
i,j Zi,j in the following test statistic,
2
pi
(1)
=
(
1
n̂
(Hi,· + Zi,·) : i ∈ [r]
)
, pi
(2)
=
(
1
n̂
(H·,j + Z·,j) : j ∈ [c]
)
M̂ = Diag
(
p(pi
(1)
,pi
(2)
)
)
− p(pi(1),pi(2))
(
p(pi
(1)
,pi
(2)
)
)ᵀ
+
1
ρ
Irc
T̂
(n)
KR
(
ρ/n; (pi(1),pi(2))
)
=
1
n
(
H +Z − np
(
pi(1),pi(2)
))ᵀ
Π
(
M̂
)−1
Π
(
H +Z − np
(
pi(1),pi(2)
))
(10)
We use this statistic because it is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random variable given the null
hypothesis holds, which follows directly from the general chi-square theory presented in Kifer and Rogers
(2017).
Theorem 6.3. Under the null hypothesis that U and V are independent, then we have as n→∞
min
pi(1),pi(2)
{
T̂
(n)
KR
(
ρ/n; (pi(1),pi(2))
)}
D→ χ2(r−1)(c−1).
We present the test in Algorithm 6 for Gaussian noise which uses the statistic in (10).
Algorithm 6 LzCDP Independence Test with Gaussian Mechanism: LocalNoiseIND
Input: (x1, · · · ,xn), ρ, α.
Let H =
∑n
`=1 x`
Set q = minpi(1),pi(2)
{
T̂
(n)
KR
(
ρ/n; (pi(1),pi(2))
)}
given in (10).
if q > χ2(r−1)(c−1),1−α then
Decision ← Reject.
else
Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
We then have the following result which follows from the privacy analysis from before.
Theorem 6.4. LocalNoiseIND is ρ-LzCDP.
6.2 Independence Test with the Exponential Mechanism
Next we want to design an independence test when the data is generated fromMEXP given in Algorithm 2.
In this case our contingency table can be written as Hˇ ∼ Multinomial (n, pˇ(pi(1),pi(2))) where β = 1e+rc−1
and we use (4) to get
pˇ(pi(1),pi(2)) = β
(
(e − 1)pi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ
+ 1
)
(11)
We then obtain an estimate for the unknown parameters,
2We will follow a common rule of thumb for small sample sizes, so that if npi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ ≤ 5 for any cell, then we simply fail
to reject H0
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pi(1) =
1
β (e − 1)
(
Hˇi,·
n
− cβ : i ∈ [r]
)
,
pi(2) =
1
β (e − 1)
(
Hˇ·,j
n
− rβ : j ∈ [c]
)
Tˇ
(n)
Exp () =
∑
i,j
(
Hˇi,j − npˇi,j
(
pi(1),pi(2)
))2
npˇi,j(pi
(1),pi(2))
(12)
We can then prove the following result, which uses Theorem 6.2.
Theorem 6.5. Assuming U and V are independent with true probability vectors pi(1),pi(2) > 0 respectively,
then as n→∞ we have Tˇ(n)Exp () D→ χ2(r−1)(c−1).
Proof. Note that pi(1),pi(2) both converge in probability to the true parameters pi(1),pi(2), respectively due
to E
[
Hˇ/n
]
= pˇ(pi(1),pi(2)) and V
[
Hˇ/n
]→ 0. We then form the following statistic in terms of parameters
θ(1) in the r dimensional simplex with all positive components and θ(2) in the c dimensional simplex with all
positive components,
Tˇ
(n)
Exp
(
θ(1), θ(2); 
)
= n
(
Hˇ/n− pˇ(θ(1), θ(2))
)ᵀ
Diag
(
pˇ(pi(1),pi(2))
)−1 (
Hˇ/n− pˇ(θ(1), θ(2))
)
We then have the following calculation,(
pi(1),pi(2)
)
= argmin
θ(1),θ(2)
{
Tˇ
(n)
Exp
(
θ(1), θ(2); 
)}
.
Note that
√
n
(
Hˇ/n− pˇ(pi(1),pi(2))) D→ N (0, C(θ)) where C(θ) = Diag(pˇ(θ(1), θ(2)))−pˇ(θ(1), θ(2)) (pˇ(θ(1), θ(2)))ᵀ
is the covariance matrix for the multinomial random variable.
We then apply Theorem 6.2 to prove the statement, so we verify that the following equalities hold,
C(θ) ·Diag
(
pˇ(θ(1), θ(2))
)−1
· C(θ) = C(θ)
and
C(θ) ·Diag
(
pˇ(θ(1), θ(2))
)−1
∇
(
θ(1)
(
θ(2)
)ᵀ)
=
(
Irc − pˇ(θ(1), θ(2))1ᵀ
)
∇
(
θ(1)
(
θ(2)
)ᵀ)
= ∇
(
θ(1)
(
θ(2)
)ᵀ)
where the last equality follows from the last coordinates of each probability vector can be written as
θ
(1)
r = 1−∑r−1i=1 θi and θ(2)c = 1−∑c−1j=1 θ(2)j .
We then use this result to design our private chi-square test for independence.
We then have the following result which again follows from the privacy analysis from before.
Theorem 6.6. LocalExpIND is -LDP.
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Algorithm 7 Local DP IND Test: LocalExpIND
Input: x = (x1, · · · ,xn), , α, H0 : p = p0.
Let Hˇ =
∑n
i=1MEXP(xi, ).
Set q = Tˇ
(n)
Exp () from (12)
if q > χ2d−1,1−α, Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
6.3 Independence Test with Bit Flipping
Lastly, we design an independence test when the data is reported via Mbit in Algorithm 4. Assuming
that H =
∑n
`=1X ` ∼ Multinomial
(
n,p(pi(1),pi(2))
)
, then we know that replacing p0 with p(pi(1),pi(2)) in
Section 5.2 gives us the following asymptotic distribution (treating the contingency table of values as a vector)
with covariance matrix Σ(·) given in (6)
√
n
H˜n −

(
e/2 − 1
e/2 + 1
)
pi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ
+
1
e/2 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p˜(pi(1),pi(2))


D→ N
(
0,Σ
(
pi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ))
(13)
Similar to analysis for Theorem 6.5, we start with a rough estimate for the unknown parameters which
converges in probability to the true estimates, so we again use α =
(
e/2−1
e/2+1
)
to get
pi
(1)
=
(
1
α
)(
H˜i,·
n
− c
e/2 + 1
: i ∈ [r]
)
pi
(2)
=
(
1
α
)(
H˜·,j
n
− r
e/2 + 1
: j ∈ [c]
)
(14)
We then give the resulting statistic, parameterized by the unknown parameters pi(`), for ` ∈ {1, 2}. For middle
matrix M˜ = ΠΣ
(
pi
(1)
(
pi
(2)
)ᵀ)−1
Π, we have
T˜
(n)
BitFlip
(
θ(1), θ(2); 
)
=
1
n
(
H˜ − np˜
(
θ(1), θ(2)
))ᵀ
M˜
(
H˜ − np˜
(
θ(1), θ(2)
))
(15)
Theorem 6.7. Under the null hypothesis that U and V are independent with true probability vectors
pi(1),pi(2) > 0 respectively, then we have as n→∞, minθ(1),θ(2)
{
T˜
(n)
BitFlip
(
θ(1), θ(2); 
)} D→ χ2(r−1)(c−1).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.5, we will use Theorem 6.2, so we first need to the verify the following
equality holds, where p(θ) = θ(1)
(
θ(2)
)ᵀ
ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π · Σ (p(θ))−1 ·ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π = ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π.
Recall that Σ(p(θ)) has an eigenvector of all 1’s and the other eigenvectors are orthogonal to it. Hence, when
we diagonalize Σ(p(θ)) = BDBᵀ, then ΠB is going to be the same as B except the column of all 1’s becomes
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zero, which we will denote as B∗. Hence, Σ(p(θ))ΠΣ(p(θ))−1ΠΣ(p(θ)), becomes BD∗Bᵀ where D∗ is the
same as D except the eigenvalue on the diagonal for the eigenvector of all 1’s becomes zero. Then projecting
the resulting matrix with Π will not change the resulting product We then have
ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π · Σ (p(θ))−1 ·ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π
= ΠBD∗BᵀΠ = ΠΣ(p(θ))Π.
We then need to show that the following equality holds
ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π · Σ(p(θ))−1Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2))
= Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2))
We again use the fact that Σ(p(θ)) has an eigenvector that is all 1’s. Hence, we have
ΠΣ(p(θ))Π = Σ(p(θ))− e
/2
rc · (e/2 + 1)211
ᵀ.
We then have,
ΠΣ (p(θ)) Π · Σ(p(θ))−1Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2))
=
(
Σ(p(θ))− e
/2
rc · (e/2 + 1)211
ᵀ
)
· Σ(p(θ))−1Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2))
=
(
Irc − 1
rc
11ᵀ
)
Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2))
= ΠΠ∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2)) = Π∇p˜(θ(1), θ(2)).
Algorithm 8 Local DP IND Test: LocalBitFlipIND
Input: (x1, · · · ,xn), , α.
Let H˜ =
∑n
i=1Mbit(xi, ).
q = minpi(1),pi(2)
{
T˜
(n)
BitFlip
(
; (pi(1),pi(2))
)}
from (15).
if q > χ2(r−1)(c−1),1−α Decision ← Reject.
else Decision ← Fail to Reject.
Output: Decision
We present the test in Algorithm 8. The following result follows from same privacy analysis as before.
Theorem 6.8. LocalBitFlipIND is -LDP.
6.4 Empirical Results
As we did for the locally private goodness of fit tests, we empirically compare the power for our various tests
for independence. We consider the null hypothesis that the two sequences of categorical random variables
{U `}n`=1 and {V `}n`=1 are independent of one another. Under an alternate hypothesis, we generate the
contingency data according to a non-product distribution. We fix the distribution p(1) for the contingency
15
table to be of the following form, where pi(1) ∈ Rr is the unknown distribution for {U `}n`=1, pi(2) ∈ Rc is the
unknown distribution for {V `}n`=1, and r, c are even
p(1) = pi(1)
(
pi(2)
)ᵀ
+ η(1,−1, · · · ,−1, 1)ᵀ(1,−1, · · · ,−1, 1) (16)
Note that the hypothesis test does not know the underlying pi(i) for i ∈ {1, 2}, but to generate the data we must
fix these distributions. We show power results when the marginal distributions satisfy pi(1) = (1/r, · · · , 1/r)
and pi(2) = (1/c, · · · , 1/c). In Figure 3, we give results for various n and  ∈ {1, 2, 4} for the case when
(r, c) = (2, 2) and η = 0.01 as well as the case when (r, c) = (10, 4) and η = 0.005.
Note that we only give results for the two tests LocalExpIND and LocalBitFlipIND.
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Figure 3: Comparison of empirical power of classical non-private test versus local private tests LocalExpIND
(dashed line), and LocalBitFlipIND (dotted line). In the left plot we set (r, c) = (2, 2) and η = 0.01 while we
set (r, c) = (10, 4) and η = 0.005 in the right plot for the contingency table data distribution given in (16).
7 Conclusion
We have designed several hypothesis tests, each depending on different local differentially private algorithms:
LocalNoiseGOF (LocalLapGOF), LocalExpGOF, and LocalBitFlipGOF as well as their corresponding inde-
pendence tests LocalNoiseIND, LocalExpIND, and LocalBitFlipIND. This required constructing different
statistics so that the resulting distribution after injecting noise into the data in order to satisfy privacy could
be closely approximated with a chi-square distribution. Hence, we designed rules for when a null hypothesis H0
should be rejected while satisfying some bound α on Type I error. Further, We showed that each statistic has
a noncentral chi-square distribution when the data is drawn from some alternate hypothesis H1. Depending
on the form of the alternate probability distribution, the dimension of the data, and the privacy parameter,
either LocalExpGOF or LocalBitFlipGOF gave better power. This corroborates the results from Kairouz
et al. (2014) who showed that in hypothesis testing, different privacy regimes have different optimal local
differentially private mechanisms, although utility in their work was in terms of KL divergence. Our results
show that the power of the test is directly related to the noncentral parameter of the test statistic that is
used. This requires the data analyst to carefully consider alternate hypotheses, as well as the data dimension
and privacy parameter for a particular test and then see which test statistic results in the largest noncentral
parameter. We focused primarily on goodness of fit testing, where the null hypothesis is a single probability
distribution. We further developed local private independence tests which resulted in using previous general
16
chi-square theory presented in Kifer and Rogers (2017). This basic framework can be used to develop other
chi-square hypothesis tests where the null hypothesis is not a single parameter. We hope that this will lead
to future work on designing local differentially private hypothesis tests beyond chi-square testing.
17
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.7. This follows from the central limit theorem. We first compute the expected value
1
n
E
[
H˜
]
=
e/2
e/2 + 1
p +
1
e/2 + 1
(1− p).
In order to compute the covariance matrix, we consider the diagonal term (j, j)
E
[
(H˜j)
2
]
=
e/2
e/2 + 1
pj +
1
e/2 + 1
(1− pj)
Next we compute the off diagonal term (j, k)
E
[
H˜j H˜k
]
=
(
e/2
e/2 + 1
)2
Pr [Xj = 1 & Xk = 1]
+
e/2(
e/2 + 1
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+
1(
e/2 + 1
)2 Pr [Xj = 0 & Xk = 0]
=
(
1
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)2 [
e/2 (pj + pk) + (1− pj − pk)
]
Before we construct the covariance matrix, we simplify a few terms
E
[
(H˜j)
2
]
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Further, we have
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Putting this together, the covariance matrix can then be written as
Σ(p) = E
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] (
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])ᵀ
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